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ABSTRACT
We propose a method for detecting insertion and deletion of whole
frames in digital videos. We start by strengthening and extending a
state of the art method for double encoding detection, and propose a
system that is able to locate the point in time where frames have been
deleted or inserted, discerning between the two cases. The proposed
method is applicable even when different codecs are used for the first
and second compression, and performs well even when the second
encoding is as strong as the first one.
Index Terms— Video Forensics, Video Splicing, Video Tam-
pering, Frame Deletion, Frame Addition, Frame Removal.
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital videos (DV) are being used everyday for security purposes,
and they are usually considered a more reliable source of evidence
than still images. This fact is probably motivated by the consider-
able skills that are needed to produce a forged video, since intro-
ducing and removing objects from videos proves hard to do. On the
other hand, in many cases the meaning of a video can be distorted
by simply removing, replicating or inserting a group of frames. For
example, such an attack proves to be extremely dangerous in con-
texts like video surveillance, where eliminating a group of frames
can make the video totally useless.
In the last years, Video Forensics has emerged as a discipline
aiming at investigating the processing history of DVs in a blind fash-
ion [1]. Since DVs are commonly stored in a compressed form, sev-
eral works have been presented for detecting whether a video has
been encoded twice [2, 3, 4] or even multiple times [5]. Although
being very interesting from a scientific point of view, this task does
not help much in assessing the reliability of the content, since multi-
ple compressions do not necessarily imply a video forgery.
Video Forensics also studies the integrity of DVs, trying to ex-
pose manipulations; focusing on this, it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween intra-frame forgeries, where the attacker alters the content of
single frames (e.g. by introducing or removing objects), and inter-
frame forgeries, where (group of) frames are entirely deleted, in-
serted or even replicated. Being very different, these attacks must
be investigated using distinct techniques. In the literature, detec-
tion of intra-frame forgery has been investigated by adapting meth-
ods developed for images [6, 7, 8]. On the other hand, the prob-
lem addressed in this paper, that is inter-frame forgery detection, has
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been faced in the literature by exploiting the frame grouping strategy
adopted by all common video encoders [9, 6, 10].
The method we propose in this paper relies on the fact that cre-
ating a forged video always implies a double compression, with the
first encoding being performed during acquisition and the second af-
ter tampering. Therefore, we adopt a state of the art method for dou-
ble encoding detection [2] and we modify it so as to make it robust
to frame removal between the two encodings; then, we design an al-
gorithm that iteratively uses this improved method to detect whether
a misalignment in the frame structure of the video occurred between
the two encodings. If this is the case, we detect the point where the
misalignment occurs and also classify the attack distinguishing be-
tween frame deletion and insertion. As we show in the experimental
validation, the proposed approach has the advantage of being able to
work when different coding algorithms are used in the first and sec-
ond compression, a situation that is very common when dealing with
DVs. To the best of our knowledge, this aspect was only partially
investigated in [10], where different strategies for GOP structuring
were simulated. Furthermore, acceptable performance are retained
even when the second compression is stronger than the former. Fi-
nally, the method is computationally convenient, since a video can
be analyzed even without going through the decoding chain.
In order to provide a clear explanation of our contribution, we
first introduce some basic concepts of video coding, then we briefly
explain the adopted method for double encoding detection, and fi-
nally we propose our approach for inter-frame forgery localization.
A set of experiments are carried out to investigate the robustness of
the approach under a wide range of conditions.
2. BASIC CONCEPTS OF VIDEO CODING
A digital video is basically a sequence of still pictures shot at a suf-
ficiently high rate (typical values are 25 or 30 frame per seconds).
The resulting signal can be conveniently compressed by reducing
both spatial and temporal redundancy. In order to do that, common
video coding algorithms like MPEG-2 [11], MPEG-4 [12] and H.264
[13] employ a block-based hybrid video coding approach, and di-
vide pictures into different types: intra-coded pictures, referred to as
I-frames, and predictive-coded pictures, commonly named P-frames
and B-frames. During encoding, frames are grouped in GOPs (group
of pictures) according to a structure that always starts with an I-frame
and then allows a certain number of predictive frames. The total
number of frames composing a GOP is called GOP size. In this pa-
per we focus on fixed-GOP encoding, where the GOP structure and
size are kept constant. When encoding a frame, the encoder divides
it in macroblocks (MBs) and codes each MB separately: MBs be-
longing to I-frames are always encoded without making reference to
other frames, while MBs belonging to predictive-coded frames may
also be encoded making reference to previous frames (this is the only
possibility in P-frames) or even future frames (allowed in B-frames).
In the following, we will refer to MBs that are encoded without tem-
poral prediction as intra-coded, and denote them as I-MBs; similarly,
we will write P-MBs for those MBs that are encoded making refer-
ence to other frames. Finally, the encoder has the possibility to skip
a MB, if this MB can be directly copied from a previous frame: these
MBs are denoted as S-MBs. For a more detailed description of video
coding the reader may refer to [14].
3. DOUBLE ENCODING DETECTION
Recently, the Variation of Prediction Footprint (VPF) has been pre-
sented as a valid tool for detecting whether a video has been encoded
twice [2]. Since the method we propose builds on this footprint, we
provide here a brief explanation of it, while details can be found in
the original paper.
Suppose a video is encoded twice using a fixed GOP size G1 for
the first encoding and a fixed GOP G2 for the second encoding, and
that only I- and P- frames are used. Authors of [2] observed that
when a frame originally encoded as intra is re-encoded as a P-frame,
an anomalous decrease in the number of S-MBs occurs, together
with an increment in the number of I-MBs. According to the nota-
tion in [2], we denote with i(n) the number of intra-coded MBs used
within the n-th frame, n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} with N being the total
number of frames. Similarly, we denote with s(n) the number of
skipped MBs. Since in I-frames only I-MBs are allowed, the signal
i(n) presents strong peaks at multiples of G2; these peaks are re-
placed by the average between the previous and following elements
of the signal; the same is done for s(n). Then, the set P is defined
as containing only those frames that show, simultaneously, a higher
number of I-MB and a smaller number of S-MB compared to the
previous and following frames. For frames in P the strength of the
VPF is evaluated by summing the product of the slopes as follows:
v(n) = |(i(n)− i(n− 1))(s(n)− s(n− 1))|+
+ |(i(n+ 1)− i(n))(s(n+ 1)− s(n))| ,
while the v(n) is defined to be 0 for frames not in P .
The signal v(n) is expected to show peaks in correspondence of
those P-frames that are the re-encoded version of a previous I-frame;
if G1 was fixed, this results in periodic peaks in v(n). Therefore, au-
thors of [2] propose to search for the presence of such a periodicity
in v(n) so as to detect double encoding and, simultaneously, esti-
mate G1. Classical methods like analysis in the Fourier domain are
not appropriate for the case at hand, because periodicity have to be
detected relying on a small number of observed periods. For this rea-
son, authors of [2] propose to create a set C of possible candidates:
C ={c ∈ {2, . . . , N} : ∃ n1, n2 ∈ P,GCD(n1, n2) = c}.
For each element in C, a composite fitness function φ(c) = φ1(c)−
φ2(c)− φ3(c) is defined, where:
• φ1(c) accumulates the value of v(n) in integer multiples of
the candidate c, formally:
φ1(c) =
∑
i=kc
v(i) , with i ∈ P, k ∈
[
0,
⌊
N
c
⌋]
.
• φ2(c) penalizes for the absence of peaks in multiples of the
candidate c:
φ2(c) =
∑
i=kc
β , with i /∈ P, k ∈
[
0,
⌊
N
c
⌋]
,
where β is the penalization factor, authors suggest β = 0.1×
maxn{v(n)};
• φ3(c) penalizes the presence of periodic noise, limiting to the
strongest periodic component:
φ3(c) = max
z∈[1,c−1]

bN/zc∑
k=0
v(kz)
 .
As a last step, the highest value Φ obtained for φ(c) is compared
to a threshold: if Φ is above the threshold, the video is classified as
double encoded and G1 is estimated as
Gˆ1 = arg max
c∈C
φ(c). (1)
4. DETECTING FRAME REMOVAL AND INSERTION
Now that we have introduced the VPF and briefly explained how it
can be used to detect double encoding, we turn to show how the same
effect can be exploited to detect inter-frame video tampering.
Let us suppose that a video is captured, then a set of frames is
removed using some editing software, and the final video is saved
(i.e., re-encoded). If we maintain the assumptions given at the be-
ginning of Section 3, we still expect to find the VPF in the altered
video but, due to the removal of frames, the peaks will no longer
be periodic throughout the whole video. Instead, we expect to find
a phase discontinuity located at the point where the cut took place,
provided that the user did not eliminate a number of frames that is
an integer multiple of G1. In the following, we show how to search
and exploit such a discontinuity. First we introduce an improvement
to the method in [2], so as to allow double encoding detection even
when a group of leading frames is removed, and also estimate the
number of removed frames. Then, we propose an iterative algorithm
that, leveraging on the improved method, detects removal and inser-
tion of frames throughout the video.
4.1. Increasing the robustness of the VPF
We begin by noticing that even the removal of one frame at the be-
ginning of the video (between the two encodings) would prevent the
method in [2] from working. Indeed, periodic peaks would still ap-
pear, but since the set C is obtained by making use of the GCD op-
erator, the correct value for G1 could not be in C (neglecting noisy
peaks). This becomes evident if we consider that when the r leading
frames are removed before re-encoding, peaks would be located at
kG1− r; for r 6= zG1, z ∈ N, such numbers are not divisible by G1
and therefore the GCD between couples of elements in this set can-
not be G1. This limitation is clearly due to the fact that the method
in [2] is explicitly thought to detect double encoding, without con-
sidering any form of frame manipulation.
In order to overcome this drawback, we propose to expose the in-
herent periodicity of v(n) by working on its autocorrelationRvv(τ),
evaluated for lags τ = 0, . . . , N − 1. By using the very same ap-
proach for periodicity estimation presented in the previous section,
but working on Rvv(τ) instead of v(n), we obtain robustness to the
removal of a set of leading frames. Furthermore, once we have an
estimate Gˆ1 of the period, we can also easily estimate the number of
removed frames modulo Gˆ1; this quantity will be termed shift from
now on for brevity, and it will be denoted by sˆ. Let us introduce the
following function:
ψ(s) =
∑⌊N−sGˆ1 ⌋
i=0 v(iGˆ1 + s)
N
, (2)
that is the mean of the signal v(·) at multiples of Gˆ1 displaced by s.
Then, we can estimate the shift as:
sˆ = arg max
s∈{0,...,Gˆ1−1}
ψ(s). (3)
4.2. Iterative analysis for frame removal localization
The algorithm explained in Section 3 works even when the number
of available frames is limited: as the authors report [2], 4·G1 frames
are usually sufficient to obtain a correct estimate of G1. This fact
suggests that the video could be analyzed in many sub-parts (e.g.,
by moving an analysis window) rather then as a whole. While this
would not help in the case of a video that is just compressed twice,
it would allow us to search for inconsistencies within a manipulated
video. Such an approach would not be possible with the original
method, since it is not invariant to frame shifting. However, by using
the modified version proposed in Section 4.1, we can use a moving-
window analysis to estimate the shift sˆ at every iteration. Let us
assume the analysis window is moved by one frame at each iteration.
In the case of a double compressed video (without frame removal),
the shift is expected to be a periodic function of period G1, which
decreases linearly from G1−1 to 0 and then starts again from G1−1,
as in Fig. 1 (left). On the contrary, if a number of frames is removed
that is not a multiple of G1, the proposed method would detect the
correct value for G1 both before and after the manipulation, but the
shift would present a phase discontinuity in correspondance to the
first removed frame, as in Fig. 1 (right).
Inspired by this fact, we propose the following procedure to de-
tect these discontinuities and remove those that are due to noise.
Given a video, we first compute the signal v(n) as defined in Section
3. In order to get a reliable estimate of G1 even in the presence of
a manipulation, we analyze the signal v(n) with a sliding window
of size W , shifting it by one frame at a time. At each step we use
the modified approach proposed in Section 4.1 to estimate G1, thus
obtaining a signal g(n), n = 0, . . . , N −W containing the estimate
of G1 at each window position. Then, the overall estimate of G1 for
the video is defined as:
G˜1 = mode(g(n)), (4)
where mode(·) denotes the statistical mode of the signal. Using G˜1,
we repeat the window-based analysis to estimate the value of the
shift at each window, according to equation (3), thus obtaining the
shift array σ(n), n = 0, . . . , N −W that was plotted in Figure 1.
To better highlight the phase discontinuity in this signal, we remove
the periodic component due to the shift of the window, and define:
σh(n) = mod (n+ σ(n), G˜1). (5)
In the ideal case, σh(n) should be a step function with value 0 un-
til the point of the cut is reached, then it should move to the value
C mod G1, where C is the number of removed frames. Due to noise
in the original signal v(n), however, other peaks may be present in
σh(n) that are not related to manipulations. These kinds of impul-
sive noise can be safely mitigated by adopting a median filtering of
Fig. 2. Adopted algorithm for cut detection, given the set of indices
where the signal σ′h(n) is not null.
σh(n). Since we are mostly interested in where the discontinuity is
located, the first order derivative σ′h(n) is computed from the filtered
signal, and the set L is defined as:
L = {l : σ′h(l) 6= 0, l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N −W}}. (6)
If the set L is empty, the video is classified as not containing frame
removal or insertions. If the set is not empty, a further step of analy-
sis is carried out before classifying the video as manipulated. Indeed,
we know that frame removal would cause a durable change in the
step function σh(n), since once the phase is broken the displacement
should remain constant. This information helps us in discarding ele-
ments in L that are due to noisy measurements; we propose to adopt
the algorithm in Fig. 2, where the value ∆ denotes the minimum
allowed distance between two consecutive peaks.
4.3. Extension to localization of frame insertion
Let us now suppose that the manipulated video is obtained by insert-
ing a group of frames coming from a different sequence, that was
encoded using a constant GOP size G21 different from G1. Under
these conditions, the described algorithm is expected to detect two
cutting point, one at the beginning and one at the end of the injected
sequence, where the phase discontinuity changes again. Let us de-
note as l1 and l2 the frame indexes where the first and the second
discontinuity are localized, respectively. In order to distinguish be-
tween two independent frame removals and a frame insertion, we
can verify whether the estimate of the GOP value between l1 and
l2 coincides with the estimate on the rest of the sequence or not.
Formally, we propose to calculate:
G˜
2
1 = mode(g(n)), l1 ≤ n ≤ l2
G˜
1
1 = mode(g(n)), n < l1 ∨ n > l2.
Finally, frame insertion is detected if G˜
2
1 6= G˜11, and G˜21 is chosen as
the estimate of the GOP size for the pasted sequence.
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Fig. 1. An example of the shift signal σ(n) for a double compressed sequence (left) and a manipulated sequence (right), where a group of
frames were removed starting from position 190.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed method
in discriminating between double compressed and manipulated
videos, and between different kinds of manipulation. Classifica-
tion between single- and double-encoded videos is an embedded
functionality of the method in [2], and it is not addressed here.
To generate our dataset, a group of 14 well-known YUV un-
compressed videos has been downloaded1 with CIF resolution, i.e.,
352×288 pixels. Each sequence has been extended to be 1250
frames long using mirrored frames repetition, thus avoiding abrupt
changes in content. Throughout our experiments, we used MPEG-
2, MPEG-4 and H.264 as possible encoders to compress videos2.
Bitrates were taken from the set {100, 300, 700} (CBR compres-
sion mode was used); values for G1 were allowed to take values in
{12,15,31}, while values for G2 were taken from {10,20,25}. By
taking all possible combinations of the above parameters, a total
of 10206 double compressed videos were generated. To generate
videos with frame deletion, each sequence was decoded after the first
compression, a group of 100 frames were removed from a random
point, then the second encoding was performed. This originated
10206 manipulated test sequences.
Given these two sets of videos, we run the proposed analysis,
using W = 100, ∆ = 50, and using a width of 200 for the median
filtering. Since the VPF is affected by the encoding settings, perfor-
mance of our method also depends on them; the two most important
parameters are the codec and bitrate used for the first and second
compression [2]. For this reason, we plot marginalized results in
Table 1 for the different couples of first/second compression codecs
and compression bitrates. Accuracies were computed averaging the
true negative rate and the true positive rate; a video was considered
as correctly classified when the localized cutting point was no farther
than W frames from the actual cutting point.
To evaluate the performance of the method for frame insertion
localization, we designed the following experiment: starting from
singly-compressed sequences, we selected two of them at random,
decoded them, and pasted 350 frames from one sequence into the
other one; finally, the spliced sequence was compressed. Since frame
insertion can be detected only when the GOP sizes of the spliced se-
quences are different, we allowed G1 to take values in {12, 15}while
G21 was set to 10. The GOP size of the second encoding, that is G2,
was chosen from {33, 40}. As stated in Section 4.3, the localiza-
tion of frame insertion follows the localization of multiple cutting
points. For this reason, we tested the capability of the method of
distinguishing between the two manipulations. To this end, frame
insertion within a video was considered as correctly localized (true
positive) when the beginning of the insertion was detected no farther
1Video available at http://trace.eas.asu.edu/yuv/, chosen sequences are:
akiyo, bridge-close, bridge-far, coastguard, container, foreman, hall, high-
way, mobile, news, paris, silent, tempete, waterfall.
2The libavcodec and x264 libraries were used, through FFmpeg.
C1/C2 MPEG-2 MPEG-4 H.264
MPEG-2 83.38 % 81.70 % 95.46 %
MPEG-4 81.83 % 79.39 % 96.25 %
H.264 76.10 % 76.19 % 88.32 %
B1/B2 100 300 700
100 85.44 % 89.68 % 91.27 %
300 77.95 % 86.55 % 88.80 %
700 75.93 % 81.04 % 81.94 %
Table 1. Accuracy of the method in distinguishing double com-
pressed and manipulated (by frame-removal) videos, plotted in
terms of first-vs-second coding algorithms (upper table) and first-
vs-second compression bitrates (bottom table).
C1/C2 MPEG-2 MPEG-4 H.264
MPEG-2 77.48 % 77.91 % 89.99 %
MPEG-4 75.15 % 74.24 % 90.52 %
H.264 70.79 % 72.80 % 84.16 %
B1/B2 100 300 700
100 86.15 % 89.71 % 90.72 %
300 70.39 % 85.30 % 89.93 %
700 55.58 % 67.51 % 81.47 %
Table 2. Accuracy in distinguishing between videos with frame in-
sertion and videos with frame removal.
than W frames from its actual position and G21 was correctly esti-
mated. On the other hand, true negative are obtained when no frame
insertion was localized in a video in which only frame removal took
place. Accuracies, obtained by averaging the true positive and true
negative rates, are reported in Table 2 for different first/second em-
ployed codecs and bitrates (results are averaged across all possible
encoding configuration for the pasted segment).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a method for localization of frame removal and in-
sertion in digital videos was proposed. The key features of the
scheme are: the robustness to the use of different codecs, the re-
tainment of acceptable performance when the last compression is
strong, and the possibility of distinguishing frame removal from
insertion. The method is open to improvements: the localization of
cutting/insertion point is not as precise as that allowed by motion-
vector based schemes, and the method has not been evaluated in
presence of global processing of the video, e.g. resizing of frames.
Finally, we point out that the proposed method cannot detect frame
manipulations when the attacker removes/inserts a whole GOP, thus
re-establishing the exact periodicity of the analyzed signal.
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